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Although enforcement is a key aspect of any drug prohibition scheme, 
changes in enforcement capabilities frequently occur independently of 
efforts by policymakers to manage the sometimes-conflicting public health 
and law enforcement components of drug policy. Since the passage of the 
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) in 1970, the surveillance tools 
available to law enforcement officers investigating narcotics crimes have 
become exponentially more powerful. By functioning as a force multiplier, 
these surveillance tools can fundamentally shift the ability of federal law 
enforcement to enforce drug laws, and consequently further augment the 
role of federal law enforcement in drug control efforts. However, the role 
of surveillance innovations in molding federal enforcement of drug laws 
has not yet been systematically analyzed in the context of the post-CSA 
policy environment.  
In this paper, I explore the relationship between efforts to enforce the 
regulatory scheme established by the CSA and the development of 
surveillance infrastructure in the United States over the last fifty years. I 
pay particular attention to how the role of the federal law enforcement in 
drug control has been shaped by advancements in law enforcement 
surveillance capabilities, and argue that efforts to understand the policy 
changes brought about by the CSA are likely to be incomplete unless they 
also consider intervening changes in surveillance capabilities. I conclude 
by discussing the federalism and policy issues raised by this analysis, and 
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to manage the sometimes-conflicting public health and law enforcement 
components of drug policy. This is particularly true in the context of developments 
in electronic surveillance, which has the potential to greatly impact the efficiency 
and efficacy of information collection during criminal investigations. Furthermore, 
these changes may not occur uniformly: some agencies may have more expertise in 
conducting electronic surveillance or additional resources to purchase expensive 
equipment, increasing their ability to take advantage of changes in electronic 
surveillance technology and leading to variation in the effects of this technology 
across agencies. Unless this variation is accounted for when amending existing drug 
regulations, reform efforts could create unanticipated consequences.  
In this paper, I explore the relationship between efforts to enforce the regulatory 
scheme established by the CSA and the development of surveillance infrastructure 
in the United States over the last fifty years. I begin by first briefly describing the 
law enforcement mechanisms originally intended to enforce the CSA. I then discuss 
significant trends in electronic surveillance since the passage of the CSA, paying 
particular attention to the available evidence on how these forms of surveillance 
have been used in narcotics investigations. Next, I turn to how these surveillance 
trends are likely to have affected surveillance practices across different categories 
of agencies in the United States, concluding that, while all agencies are likely to 
increase their ability to obtain information in the short run, in the long run 
developments in electronic surveillance technology will likely have disproportionate 
effects in the context of federal law enforcement, shifting relative investigative 
capacity toward federal agencies. Finally, I discuss the federalism and policy 
implications of this analysis and describe potential next steps for amending the CSA 
in light of my conclusions.  
 
II. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT AND DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
Prior to the passage of the Controlled Substances Act, the federal government’s 
role in enforcement of narcotics laws was somewhat limited and spread across a 
variety of agencies. While federal law enforcement was heavily involved in policing 
intoxicating substances in certain contexts,1 funding available to federal narcotics 
agencies was limited.2 Consequently, “[e]nforcement of drug laws was primarily the 
responsibility of local police” with federal agencies “occasionally assist[ing] with 
enforcement.”3 In the decades leading up to the passage of the CSA, state and local 
 
1    For a description of specific federal narcotics enforcement authorities prior to the CSA, see 
Thomas M. Quinn & Gerald T. McLaughlin, The Evolution of Federal Drug Control Legislation, 22 
CATH. U. L. REV. 586 (1973).  
2    Phil Nicholas & Andrew Churchill, The Federal Bureau of Narcotics, the States, and the 
Origins of Modern Drug Enforcement in the United States, 1950–1962, 39 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 
595, 601 (2012).  
3    LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESCH. SERV., R43749, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 
HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 4 (2014).  
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law enforcement increased the number of law enforcement officers detailed to 
narcotics enforcement and intensified their enforcement of narcotics crimes.4 While 
federal drug arrests were relatively flat during this time period, federal narcotics 
enforcement agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Narcotics played a key role by 
training state and local narcotics officers.5  
This division of labor echoed traditional views of the roles of state and federal 
governments in investigating and prosecuting crime prior to the 1960s. In the United 
States, plenary police powers—which include “the suppression of violent crime and 
vindication of its victims”—are “denied the National Government and reposed in 
the States.”6 Although states have broad capabilities to enact and enforce criminal 
statutes,7 the federal government was intended to be minimally involved in defining 
and managing crime.8 The federal government began to play a broader role in 
combating crime during the twentieth century, first through the passage of statutes 
dealing with criminal activities with a close nexus to interstate commerce, such as 
mail fraud,9 and then transitioning to activities that had customarily been prohibited 
under state law.10 As part of this trend, Congress began to “enlist federal criminal 
law in the service of national moral crusades,”11 including efforts to fight use and 
abuse of narcotic drugs. This expansion of federal involvement in criminal law has 
not been uncontroversial. A task force assembled by the American Bar Association 
published a report in 1999 that referred to the increase in federal criminal law as 
“troubling”,12 noting that “[i]nappropriate federalization strains the fabric of the 
federal-state system.”13  
Against this background, the passage of the Controlled Substances Act in 1970 
was meant to mark a move by the federal government away from a punitive approach 
 
4    Nicholas & Churchill, supra note 2, at 605, 611–12.  
5    Nicholas & Churchill, supra note 2, at 612-13. (“[T]he Narcotic Control Act of 1956 created 
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics Training School where state and local officers received narcotics 
training. By 1963 it had trained 900 officers…This school helped the FBN improve the ability of state 
and local governments to enforce their drug laws.”).  
6    United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).  
7    Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. 
REV. 789, 790 (1996).  
8    Daniel C. Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME 
& JUST. 377, 382–84 (2006).  
9    John S. Baker et al., The Federalization of Criminal Law, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 6 (1999) 
[hereinafter The Federalization of Criminal Law].  
10   Ashdown, supra note 7, at 791.  
11   Richman, supra note 8, at 384.  
12   Baker et al., supra note 9, at 5.  
13   Id. at 24.  
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to social harms caused by drug use and toward an approach that balanced 
enforcement approaches with therapeutic approaches.14 As part of the process of 
implementing the CSA, in 1973 President Nixon authorized the creation of the Drug 
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”)—a new federal agency to centralize and combine 
federal drug enforcement efforts previously spread across several entities.15 This 
centralization process was explicitly tied to a perceived need for a more powerful 
narcotics enforcement agency on the federal level. According to President Nixon, 
creation of the DEA was necessary because “‘the federal government is fighting the 
war on drug abuse under a distinct handicap, for its efforts are those of a loosely 
confederated alliance facing a resourceful, elusive, worldwide enemy.’”16 Narcotics-
related intelligence gathering was seen as a critical and necessary function for the 
newly-founded DEA; the Office of Intelligence was quickly established and tasked 
with, among other things, “[i]ncreas[ing] the efficiency in the reporting, analysis, 
storage, retrieval, and exchange” of narcotics-related intelligence.17  
Use of the narcotics enforcement infrastructure developed after the passage of 
the CSA has changed over the years in response to changing federal priorities and 
approaches to addressing drug use in the United States. Specifically, the Reagan-era 
shift toward increased reliance on enforcement mechanisms to manage substance 
use saw an expansion of DEA authority to include more direct oversight for 
practitioners who were registered to prescribe scheduled controlled substances. 
Simultaneously, more sophisticated use of data processing tools further facilitated 
communication with the myriad of agencies involved with narcotics regulation 
across the United States.18  
However, even as the role of federal agencies in enforcing narcotics laws has 
expanded over the years, “[m]ost drug arrests are made by state and local law 
enforcement, and most of these arrests are for possession rather than sale or 
manufacturing.”19 In part, the difference between the number of federal and state 
drug arrests may be attributable to differences in the availability of police manpower 
 
14   “This law represents a transition between reliance on law enforcement with severe penalties 
and a therapeutic approach — even a tolerance for at least some previously forbidden drug use.” DAVID 
F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 255 (1999). See also H. R. REP. 
91-11 (1970) (“This legislation is designed to deal in a comprehensive fashion with the growing 
menace of drug abuse in the United States (1) through providing authority for increased efforts in drug 
abuse prevention and rehabilitation of users, (2) through providing a more effective means for law 
enforcement aspects of drug abuse prevention and control, and (3) by providing for an overall balanced 
scheme of criminal penalties for offenses involving drugs.”).  
15   Sacco, supra note 3, at 5–6.  
16   DRUG ENF’T ADMIN., The DEA Years 34, https://www.dea.gov/sites/default/files/2018-
07/1970-1975%20p%2030-39.pdf.  
17   Id.  
18   Id. at 56–57.  
19   Sacco, supra note 3, at 21.  
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at the federal and state/local level. As of 2016, there were about 130,000 full-time 
officers at federal law enforcement agencies, about 80,000 of whom were engaged 
in criminal investigation roles.20 In that same year, there were about 650,000 sworn 
state and local law enforcement officers.21 The difference between drug enforcement 
arrests made at the federal and state level is also likely attributable to long-standing 
differences in enforcement strategies across different levels of government. Federal 
enforcement efforts tend to be more heavily focused on importation and high-level 
distribution acts within the United States,22 while state and local enforcement efforts 
are more heavily focused on lower-level distribution acts and users.  
 
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE, 1970–2020 AND 
BEYOND 
 
While narcotics policing practices at both the federal and state level have 
undoubtedly been shaped by shifts in legislative priorities and resource constraints, 
these are not the only factors contributing to changes in enforcement practices since 
the enactment of the CSA. The past fifty years has also seen enormous innovation 
in the surveillance tools available to law enforcement officers. In this section, I 
explain the state of electronic and technological surveillance tools at the time the 
CSA was passed, describe several major trends in the development of these tools 
over the last fifty years and discuss how these trends may be expected to continue in 
the future. Wherever possible, I supplement this discussion with data on use of 
electronic surveillance, particularly in the context of narcotics-related investigations.  
 
A. Electronic and Technological Surveillance, circa 1970 
 
Law enforcement officers have long had technological means at their disposal 
to obtain the contents of communications. Wiretapping—the interception of 
telephonic or electronic communications—has been used by law enforcement since 
at least the 1890s.23 By the time the CSA was passed in 1970, wiretapping was a 
highly salient but infrequently used tool in law enforcement officers’ investigative 
toolkit. According to annual Report on Applications for Orders Authorizing or 
Approving the Interception of Wire or Oral Communications, 597 authorized 
requests for wiretaps were reported to the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts in 1970, including 183 authorized by federal judges and 414 authorized by 
 
20   CONNOR BROOKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 251922, FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS, 
2016—STATISTICAL TABLES 6 (2019).  
21   FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 2016 Crime in the United States Table 25, 
https://perma.cc/WU2V-5WB9 (last visited Apr. 28, 2020).  
22   Peter Reuter & Mark A. R. Kleiman, Risks and Prices: An Economic Analysis of Drug 
Enforcement, 7 CRIME & JUST. 289, 290 (1986).  
23   SAMUEL DASH ET AL., THE EAVESDROPPERS 25 (Rutgers U. Press. 1959).  
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state judges.24 Although wiretaps were most commonly used during investigations 
of gambling and bookmaking offenses, narcotics-related crimes comprised a 
substantial proportion (approximately 21%) of the major offenses underlying 
wiretap authorizations on both the federal and state level.25  
In addition to obtaining the contents of communications by electronic 
eavesdropping, law enforcement also had tools available to allow them to conduct 
electronic location tracking, although these instruments did not provide detailed 
information and required extensive human intervention. For example, at the time the 
CSA was written, law enforcement officers could use radio-transmitting beepers to 
follow the location of an item or vehicle.26 After secretly placing a beeper on the 
object to be tracked, law enforcement officers could track the object as it moved by 
following in a car outfitted with multiple antennas and a device that measured the 
strength of the radio signal emitted from the beeper.27 Use of a radio transmitting 
beeper had several advantages over tracking an object’s location by surreptitiously 
following in a police car. Tracking beepers lowered the cost of surveillance since 
fewer officers needed to be involved in the process.28 Additionally, tracking beepers 
allowed surveillance to be conducted from a greater distance, making it less likely 
that the officers would lose contact with the object they were tracking29 and 
minimizing safety risks inherent in close vehicle pursuits.30 This process provided 
relatively imprecise information about the location of the beeper relative to the 
receiver, required the surveilling officers to remain in-range of the beeper, and did 
not create any record of the process that could be presented in court independent of 
the testimony of the investigating officers.31  
Finally, at the time the CSA was written, law enforcement officers were also 
able to utilize information from both commercial and state-run databases during 
criminal investigations. However, the computational systems for storing and 
 
24   ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT ON APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS AUTHORIZING OR 
APPROVING THE INTERCEPTION OF WIRE OR ORAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1970 
TO DECEMBER 31, 1970 454 (1971). [hereinafter THE WIRETAP REPORTS].  
25   Id.  
26   Brief for the Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 3, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (No. 10-1259).  
27   Id. at 15.  
28   Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of Surveillance: Making 
Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 Yale Law J. 335, 345-46 (2014).  
29   Brief of the Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 16, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (No. 10-1259).  
30   ANNE E. BOUSTEAD, POLICE, PROCESS, AND PRIVACY: THREE ESSAYS ON THE THIRD PARTY 
DOCTRINE 56 (2016). [hereinafter POLICE, PROCESS, AND PRIVACY].  
31   Brief for the Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 15, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (No. 10-1259).  
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accessing these data were rudimentary, increasing the difficulty of utilizing them 
during criminal investigations. For example, the DEA was an early adopter of 
electronic databases, becoming “the first law enforcement agency in the nation to 
adopt an all-electronic, centralized, computer database for its records” with the 
creation of the National Narcotics Intelligence System.32 Entering information into 
this database required transcribing reports and teletypes.33 Similarly, Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Program (“PDMP”) databases—state-run repositories of 
information about dispensed medications—have existed since the 1930s.34 While 
law enforcement officers at the time could obtain information from PDMPs during 
criminal investigations, the computational systems available at the time meant that 
doing so would require accessing information stored on magnetic tape.35 
 
B. Development of Electronic and Technological Surveillance, 1970–2020 
 
Over the course of the last 50 years, there have been dramatic and widespread 
developments in the electronic surveillance tools available to law enforcement. 
These changes can be described in terms of several common patterns. First, although 
some forms of surveillance in use at the time of the CSA’s passage are still in use 
today, the frequency and context in which these forms of surveillance are used may 
have changed substantially. For example, while wiretaps were considered a useful 
investigative tool with “a legitimate law enforcement function”36 in both 1970 and 
2020, the number of wiretap requests authorized has risen dramatically in the 
intervening years: from fewer than 600 requests reported authorized in 1970 to 
almost 3,000 requests reported authorized in 2018 (the last year for which data is 
available).37 This increase has been driven largely by an increase in the number of 
wiretaps authorized to investigate narcotics crimes.38 As can be seen by Figure 1 
below, narcotics offenses are now the underlying major offense in the vast majority 
 
32   The DEA Years, supra note 16, at 36.  
33   Id.  
34   Richard A. Deyo et al., Measures Such As Interstate Cooperation Would Improve the 
Efficacy of Programs to Track Controlled Drug Prescriptions, 32 HEALTH AFFAIRS 603, 603–04 
(2013).  
35   See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 594 (1977) for a description of how one state’s PDMP 
was operationalized during this time.  
36   Jeff Strange, A Primer on Wiretaps, Pen Registers, and Trap and Trace Devices, TEXAS 
DISTRICT & COUNTY ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, https://perma.cc/3FXA-H9L4 (last visited Apr. 28, 
2020).  
37   The Wiretap Reports, supra note 24.  
38   The Wiretap Reports provide information about the most serious crime under investigation 
for each wiretap authorization reported. Consequently, the apparent increase in the proportion of 
wiretaps authorized for narcotics-related crimes may be due to increases in the perceived seriousness 
of the narcotics crimes by the judges and prosecutors reporting these data. Id.  
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of wiretap authorizations,39 although this trend may be abating somewhat. At their 
highest point in 2014, narcotics offenses were the underlying major offenses for 
almost 90% of all wiretap authorizations in both state and federal court.  
Second, surveillance methods in place at the time the CSA was passed have 
been replaced with other tools that provide more accurate information at lower cost. 
For example, law enforcement officers now have a wide array of methods for 
electronically tracking an individual or object’s location, including use of GPS 
trackers and cell site location information. GPS trackers are small devices that law 
enforcement officers can attach to the object they seek to track; the tracker can 
calculate its location by determining its distance to multiple satellites40 and then 
record and communicate this information to law enforcement.41 While superficially 
similar to radio-transmitting beepers, GPS trackers can provide highly accurate 
information about the target’s location42 continuously over a long period of time.43 
Because use of GPS trackers does not require continuous intervention from law 
enforcement officers, this surveillance can be conducted at a much lower cost.44  
Furthermore, law enforcement officers now have tools available to them to 
trace an individual’s location without first placing a tracking device. The percent of 
people in the United States who own a cell phone has risen steadily over the past 
two decades; as of February 2019, 96% of the United States population owns some 
form of cell phone, while 81% own a smartphone.45 In the course of providing 
cellular service, telephone companies collect and store extensive and detailed 
information about the phone’s location—and consequently about the location of the 
phone’s user.46 The type of continuous location information obtainable through 
cellular records is highly identifiable47 and incredibly sensitive, allowing inferences 
 
39   Table generated using data from the Wiretap Reports. Id.  
40   Kaitlyn A. Kerrane, Keeping Up with Officer Jones: A Comprehensive Look at the Fourth 
Amendment and GPS Surveillance, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1700 (2011).  
41   Brief for the Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 18, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (No. 10-1259).  
42   Kerrane, supra note 40, at 1700–01 (“GPS accuracy depends on the type of receiver, but the 
government reports that typical precision is within eight meters.”).  
43   Brief for the Center for Democracy & Technology et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 11, United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (No. 10-1259).  
44   Bankston & Soltani, supra note 28, at 347–48.  
45   Pew Research Center, Mobile Fact Sheet, PEWRESEARCH.ORG (June 12, 2019) 
https://perma.cc/F5EM-3LPJ.  
46   See Monu Bedi, The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth Amendment 
Doctrine Mash-Up, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 510-11 (2015).  
47   Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy Bounds of Human 
Mobility, 3 SCI. REP. 1 (2013).  
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about such intimate activities as “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the 




Figure 1: Trends in Wiretap Authorizations, 1970–2018 
 
Furthermore, cellular service providers are not the only entities that can obtain 
location information from smartphones. Mobile app developers also frequently 
collect, store, share, and sell data about the location of their users in order to provide 
services or obtain information with economic value49—information that in turn can 
be enormously useful to law enforcement.50 While the Supreme Court has recently 
clarified that Fourth Amendment protections require law enforcement to obtain a 
warrant prior to seeking cell site location information from cellular service 
providers,51 it is not clear whether and how these protections would apply to the less 
detailed location information collected by many mobile apps.  
Although location surveillance mechanisms are a highly salient part of the 
policy conversation around electronic surveillance, there is no systematic data on 
 
48   People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009).  
49   Krishna P.N. Puttaswamy & Ben Y. Zhao, Preserving Privacy in Location-Based Mobile 
Social Applications, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH WORKSHOP ON MOBILE COMPUTING SYSTEMS 
& APPLICATIONS 2 (2010).  
50   EDWARD BALKOVICH ET AL., ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF MOBILE DEVICES: 
UNDERSTANDING THE MOBILE ECOSYSTEM AND APPLICABLE SURVEILLANCE LAW 1 (2015).  
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the frequency or context of their use. However, some data are available from 
Minnesota, as the Minnesota State Court Administrator is required to publish 
biennial reports on authorizations for use of certain forms of electronic surveillance, 
including pen registers, trap and trace devices, and mobile tracking devices.52 As can 
be seen in Figure 2 below, these data suggest that a significant percentage of the 
mobile tracking orders granted in Minnesota include at least one narcotics crime, 
and this percentage has increased slightly over time. From 2006 to 2013,53 the 
proportion of mobile tracking orders that involved narcotics crimes increased by 
almost 35% and more than 70% of mobile tracking orders were granted in the 
context of narcotics investigations during the most recent year for which data are 
available.  
Third, some surveillance mechanisms with minimal technological components 
at the time the CSA was enacted in 1970 now involve extensive technological 
components. One prominent example of this phenomenon would be Prescription 
Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs). Over the past fifty years, the computational 
infrastructure used to house PDMPs has become significantly more complex and 
sophisticated, and consequently these data have become more useable during 
narcotics investigations. Modern PDMPs are now run on commercially-developed 
software that provides a range of functionality, including algorithmic tools to ensure 
information accuracy, real-time data availability, and mobile device accessibility. 
Commercially collected data—such as financial transaction information—has 
similarly become more extensively collected and available to law enforcement.54  
 
 
52   Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626A.17 (West 1989). For a full list of available reports, see Minnesota 
Legislative Reference Library, Mandate Details, https://www.leg.state.mn.us/lrl/mndocs/mandates_ 
detail?orderid=174.  
53   Due to changes in reporting practices after 2013, it is not possible to determine the percentage 
of mobile tracking orders granted in the context of narcotics crimes for subsequent years.  
54   See, e.g., David C. Gray, The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Law Enforcement Access 
to Third Party Records: Critical Perspectives From a Technology-Centered Approach to Quantitative 
Privacy, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 919, 921 (2014).  








C. Trends in Present and Future Electronic Surveillance 
 
Some scholars have argued that we are now entering a “golden age of 
surveillance,” where law enforcement has access to a breadth and depth of 
commercially-collected information that would have been unimaginable a short time 
ago.55 In addition, law enforcement officers have new tools available to help them 
parse this wealth of information efficiently and effectively. Rather than searching 
for information on specific individuals or investigations, “[t]he police will rely on 
alerts generated by computer programs that sift through the massive quantities of 
available information for patterns of suspicious activity.”56 These developments can 
be expected to provide useful new avenues for law enforcement officers 
investigating narcotics crimes.  
However, to the extent that electronic surveillance plays a critical role in 
investigating narcotics crimes, trends that reduce law enforcement access to 
electronic surveillance may have a significant impact on narcotics investigations. 
One such trend is the development of surveillance intermediaries: large technology 
 
55   Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. 
REV. 416, 464 (2012).  
56   Elizabeth E. Joh, The New Surveillance Discretion: Automated Suspicion, Big Data, and 
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companies that push back against providing information to law enforcement by 
requiring strict compliance with legal protections, narrowly construing the amount 
of information they are required to provide in response to law enforcement requests, 
and contesting information requests through litigation.57 Another is the increased 
adoption of encryption by default amongst manufacturers of consumer devices, 
which has led to concerns that law enforcement will no longer be able to access 
sources of communication data that have long been available to them.58 Also known 
as the “going dark” problem, the loss of surveillance mechanisms due to encryption 
has been identified by policymakers in multiple domains as posing a serious and 
immediate threat to public safety, causing harms that are “ultimately measured in a 
mounting number of victims.”59  
As data is not generally available on how frequently and in which context law 
enforcement officers encounter encrypted devices during criminal investigations, it 
is difficult to analyze the extent to which encryption has and will continue to impact 
narcotics investigations. Statements by Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) 
officials suggest that their agency was unable to decrypt 880 devices in 2016,60 while 
the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office reported that nearly half of the phones 
received by their High Technology Analysis Unit during a four-month period in 
2018 could not be promptly accessed.61 Reporting by the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s Office further suggests that a substantial minority of inaccessible iOS 
devices were obtained during the course of narcotics investigations.62 While the 
 
57   Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 124-25 (2018).  
58   Geoffrey S. Corn, Averting the Inherent Dangers of “Going Dark”: Why Congress Must 
Require a Locked Front Door to Encrypted Data, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1433, 1433-34 (2015).  
59   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Attorney General William P. 
Barr Delivers Keynote Address at the International Conference on Cyber Security (July 23, 2019) 
(available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-keynote-
address-international-conference-cyber).  
60   FBI officials originally stated that they were unable to access almost 8,000 devices during 
2017, although that number was later determined to be a “‘substantial over-counting” due to a 
calculation error. Lily Hay Newman, ‘Significant’ FBI Error Reignites Data Encrpytion Debate, 
WIRED (May 23, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/significant-fbi-error-reignites-data-encryption-
debate/.  
61   Report of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office on Smartphone Encryption and Public 
Safety 2 (2018), https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/2018-Report-of-the-
Manhattan-District-Attorney27s-Office-on-Smartphone-En....pdf. Note, however, that this does not 
necessarily mean that half of all phones obtained in the course of criminal investigations in Manhattan 
during this time period could not be accessed. Investigating officers could choose not to submit phones 
to the High Technology Analysis Unit if they were able to access the contents of the phone immediately 
(leading to an overestimation of the prevalence of inaccessible devices) or if they believed that further 
analysis would be futile in accessing the contents of the phone (leading to an underestimation of the 
prevalence of inaccessible devices).  
62   Report of the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office on Smartphone Encryption and Public Safety 
9 (2016), https://www.manhattanda.org/wp-content/themes/dany/files/Report%20on%20Smartphone%20 
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prevalence of inaccessible encrypted devices during narcotics investigations cannot 
currently be estimated, statements by policymakers in the law enforcement 
community suggest they consider it an immediate and serious problem. According 
to Attorney General William Barr, “just the damage done by warrant-proof 
encryption to our ability to combat drug trafficking is a cost too high to pay” and, 
without the ability to access encrypted devices, “the prospects of prosecuting the 
drug war by traditional law enforcement means are dim.”63  
 
IV. ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE DEVELOPMENT AND THE ALLOCATION OF DRUG 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 
 
Innovations in electronic surveillance have—in many circumstances—
extended law enforcement’s ability to obtain information during criminal 
investigations. In this section, I discuss how these technological changes are likely 
to induce changes in investigative practices and capacities across the myriad of 
enforcement agencies in the United States. My first point—that improvements in 
electronic surveillance tools are likely to increase the amount of information 
collected during criminal investigations and reduce the cost of obtaining this 
information—is relatively straightforward to deduce. My second point—that the 
barriers to using these new electronic surveillance tools are likely to have 
distributional effects on the types and amounts of electronic surveillance used by 
law enforcement agencies during narcotics investigations—follows from careful 
consideration of the barriers to using electronic surveillance. On the whole, this 
analysis suggests that the developments in electronic surveillance technology will 
have a disproportionate effect in the context of federal law enforcement, shifting 
relative investigative capacity toward federal agencies.  
 
 
Encryption%20and%20Public%20Safety:%20An%20Update.pdf. According to this report, 24% of 
inaccessible iOS devices were obtained during narcotics investigations, making them the second most 
common source of inaccessible devices after larceny/forgery/cybercrime/ID theft investigations.  
63   U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Public Affairs, supra note 59.  
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A. Electronic Surveillance as a Force Multiplier 
 
Electronic surveillance acts as a force multiplier:64 a tool that can be used by an 
agency to extend the reach and efficiency65 of its current employees.66 Two officers 
can do the work of an entire surveillance team if they use a radio-tracking beeper to 
track an individual’s vehicle rather than engaging in a multi-car pursuit. In turn, the 
pair of officers can dramatically shorten the time it takes them to complete their task 
if they use a GPS tracker rather than a radio-transmitting beeper. Additionally, some 
forms of new technological surveillance—such as use of historical cell site 
information records—can be used to conduct continuous and retrospective 
surveillance, increasing the effectiveness of surveillance by allowing law 
enforcement to leverage information collected before the need for surveillance was 
apparent. All-in-all, these trends suggest that new technologies will increase the 
returns to surveillance during criminal investigations, in part by allowing expensive 
manpower requirements to be replaced with less expensive technological 
alternatives.  
As technology reduces the cost of conducting surveillance, we would expect 
law enforcement to conduct more surveillance. This expectation has emerged as a 
prominent theme of efforts to regulate law enforcement access to electronic 
surveillance. As noted by Justice Alito, in United States v. Jones, while “[t]raditional 
surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly and therefore 
rarely undertaken” electronic surveillance can “make long-term monitoring 
relatively easy and cheap,” thus reducing long-standing practical protections for 
privacy.67 Indeed, some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that legal 
protections should be heightened when new forms of electronic surveillance reduce 
the cost of obtaining information, in order to prevent law enforcement from 
infringing on privacy expectations by overutilizing cheap sources of information.68  
Consequently, developments in electronic surveillance technology should 
improve efficiency in the context of narcotics investigations across a variety of 
agency types. This increase in efficiency should allow law enforcement agencies to 
conduct more narcotics investigations, even in the absence of a budget increase. 
While this effect may be even more pronounced within specialized agencies, where 
 
64   Rajiv Shah & Brendan McQuade, Surveillance, Security, and Intelligence-Led Policing in 
Chicago, in NEOLIBERAL CHICAGO  244, 253 (Larry Bennet, Roberta Garner, & Euan Hague ed., 2016).  
65   For purposes of this analysis, I will use the term efficiency to refer to the amount of 
information law enforcement can obtain per dollar spent on a particular form of surveillance. However, 
I complicate this definition in Section IV.C, describing other ways to understand efficiency in the 
context of narcotics investigations.  
66   For a definition of force multipliers in the context of policing, see Julie Ayling, Force 
Multiplier: People as a Policing Resource, 31 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 73, 77 (2007).  
67   United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 429 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).  
68   Bankston & Soltani, supra note 28, at 354. 
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officers have the opportunity to develop higher levels of expertise in conducting 
narcotics investigations, it is likely not limited to those contexts.  
 
B. Distributional Effects of Electronic Surveillance 
  
Although developments in electronic surveillance technology may have 
fundamentally transformed the ability of law enforcement to obtain information 
during narcotics investigations over the past fifty years, it is unlikely that these 
changes have occurred uniformly across the many agencies involved in policing 
narcotics crimes. Electronic surveillance is not self-executing: it requires a wide 
range of knowledge and resources to implement surveillance and use the information 
obtained effectively in an investigation and prosecution.69 Law enforcement officers 
face a number of barriers to effectively conducting electronic surveillance. For 
example, they must have access to the technical equipment necessary to conduct 
surveillance and be able to troubleshoot when a surveillance method is rendered less 
effective.70 As I will discuss in this section, the knowledge and resources necessary 
to overcome these barriers are easier to develop in the context of large, specialized 
agencies. Consequently, it is likely that specialist narcotics agencies, such as the 
DEA, are better positioned to take advantage of the technological changes that have 
facilitated law enforcement access to surveillance over the last fifty years, and 
mitigate technological and business developments that may restrain law 
enforcement’s ability to collect information now and into the future.  
First, law enforcement must be able to obtain the technical devices and services 
necessary to conduct electronic surveillance. While electronic surveillance may on 
the whole make electronic surveillance less expensive, the need to purchase 
surveillance apparatuses may introduce new types of costs with different effects on 
surveillance use and behavior. As many traditional forms of non-electronic 
surveillance are manpower intensive, use of this surveillance generally scales with 
the amount of surveillance conducted. Consequently, traditional surveillance could 
be said to have high variable costs and low fixed costs.71 For example, staking out a 
suspected drug manufacturing location requires posting officers nearby to observe 
who enters and exits the building. Since the costs of the stakeout are largely 
dependent on the labor costs of the officers involved, conducting four hours of 
surveillance should cost approximately twice as much as conducting two hours of 
surveillance. Because use of electronic surveillance may require purchasing of 
expensive equipment, use of these forms of surveillance may have high fixed costs 
and low variable costs. For example, using a cell-site simulator to identify who is in 
a building over a period of time requires a large initial outlay to purchase the 
 
69   Police, Process, and Privacy, supra note 30, at 61.  
70   Id.  
71   Variable costs change with the amount of output produced, while fixed costs must be paid 
regardless of output.  
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device.72 However, once the cell-site simulator has been purchased, many fewer 
officers are required to conduct surveillance, thus lowering the variable costs of 
obtaining information.  
Fixed and variable costs may have different effects on how much and in what 
contexts agencies are willing to expend resources on surveillance. Variable costs 
operate as a faucet, allowing law enforcement agencies to dial in the amount of 
electronic surveillance that can be supported by their budget. A department with few 
resources may nevertheless be able to support use of variable cost electronic 
surveillance in circumstances where the seriousness of the crime and the likelihood 
that valuable information will result makes expending these resources worthwhile. 
As variable costs decrease, electronic surveillance use should increase across a wide 
range of agencies. On the other hand, fixed costs operate as a bridge toll, only 
allowing access to those agencies who can pay the price of entry. As fixed costs 
decrease, we should expect to see more agencies adopt a particular electronic 
surveillance mechanism; as fixed costs increase, we should expect to see the 
electronic surveillance mechanism used by fewer (and more well-funded) agencies. 
However, once agencies are able to reach the resource threshold to opt into using a 
particular surveillance mechanism, the amount of surveillance they are able to 
conduct will depend on the variable costs associated with using that mechanism.73 
Since these variable costs are frequently low due to the efficiency gains allowed by 
electronic surveillance, agencies that can afford the upfront fixed costs to use a 
particular electronic surveillance mechanism may be expected to utilize it 
frequently. In other words, high fixed cost forms of surveillance create a dichotomy 
between agencies that have and frequently use the surveillance mechanism, and 
agencies that cannot afford the upfront costs and therefore never utilize this form of 
surveillance.  
Additionally, to effectively use electronic surveillance, law enforcement needs 
to be able to adjust and course-correct when technical or business developments 
restrain their ability to collect information. Trends such as the increased 
implementation of default encryption on consumer devices and resistance to 
cooperating with law enforcement information requests by surveillance 
intermediaries limit the availability of information during criminal investigations 
and are likely to continue to do so into the future. However, law enforcement officers 
have several methods at their disposal to mitigate the effects of these developments. 
Officers confronted with an encrypted device during an investigation may 
nonetheless be able to obtain the information they seek using an “encryption 
 
72   As of 2016, reports indicate that purchase of StingRay device packages cost approximately 
$148,000. Curtis Waltman, Here’s How Much a StingRay Cell Phone Surveillance Tool Costs, VICE 
(Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gv5k3x/heres-how-much-a-stingray-cell-phone-
surveillance-tool-costs.  
73   See generally Anne E. Boustead, Small Towns, Big Companies: How Surveillance 
Intermediaries Affect Small and Midsize Law Enforcement Agencies, Hoover Institution Aegis Series 
Paper No. 1802 (2018).  
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workaround:” a mechanism for circumventing encryption protections to access 
readable information, perhaps by guessing the password, breaking the encryption, 
or confiscating the device while it is in use and therefore unlocked.74 Similarly, law 
enforcement officers can minimize the friction created when surveillance 
intermediaries insist on formal legal process and narrowly construe the scope of 
information they are required to hand over by seeking information from companies 
that are more likely to quickly hand over information. 75   
Although law enforcement officers have several options available to them to 
mitigate the effects of emerging limitations on information gathering during criminal 
investigations, the skills and resources necessary to overcome these limitations will 
be easier to develop in the context of large, centralized, specialized agencies. 
Encryption workarounds may require the type of “technical expertise and deep 
pockets” more commonly found in federal agencies than small law enforcement 
departments.76 Consequently, as the need to circumvent encryption becomes a more 
common part of criminal investigations, “[t]his may lead to the federal government 
taking over certain kinds of state and local investigations.”77 Similarly, the barriers 
created by surveillance intermediaries are likely easier to overcome in the context of 
large, centralized law enforcement agencies, since officers from these agencies have 
more opportunities to learn how to best frame their requests to minimize the hassle 
involved in getting information.78  
 
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS FOR THE CSA 
 
In the previous sections of this paper, I have argued that changes in electronic 
surveillance technology over the past fifty years have fundamentally altered the tools 
available to law enforcement officers conducting narcotics investigations. This 
analysis specifically considers how many electronic surveillance innovations 
decrease both cost and manpower required to conduct criminal investigations, 
expanding the potential reach of law enforcement. Where changes in communication 
technology and businesses practices (such as the implementation of default 
consumer encryption) instead increase the barriers to engaging in electronic 
surveillance use, these barriers are more easily overcome by specialized and 
centralized agencies, who are better positioned to develop the expertise necessary to 
obtain information despite the obstacles. Where new surveillance tools (such as use 
of cell site simulators) allow the collection of extensive information at low cost 
 
74   See Orin S. Kerr & Bruce Schneier, Encryption Workarounds, 106 GEO. L.J. 989, 996-97 
(2018).  
75   Rozenshtein, supra note 57, at 132.  
76   Kerr & Schneier, supra note 74, at 1011.  
77   Id. at 1012. 
78   Boustead, supra note 73, at 11.  
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provided that an agency can afford the upfront fixed costs associated with 
purchasing the tool, well-resourced, specialized agencies are better positioned to 
bear purchasing costs and reap the benefits of using these tools. On the whole, these 
trends combine to shift relative investigatory power away from generalist agencies 
that rely heavily on “boots on the ground” to conduct investigations, and toward 
specialist, centralized agencies with sufficient funding to supplement limited 
manpower with electronic surveillance. In the context of narcotics investigations, 
this will advantage federal agencies like the DEA over local law enforcement 
departments.  
However, even if developments in electronic surveillance are likely to change 
the dynamics of federal and state enforcement of drug laws, it does not necessarily 
follow that this change is undesirable, or that policy intervention is required. Indeed, 
there are several reasons why a shift toward centralized federal enforcement of drug 
laws could improve outcomes. A greater emphasis on federal drug enforcement 
could promote efficiency by directing enforcement actions toward agencies with 
specialist enforcement expertise.79 Enhancing the role of federal law enforcement 
and reducing the role of state and local agencies could increase uniformity in 
enforcement across jurisdictions. Furthermore, while changes in electronic 
surveillance may shift enforcement of drug laws toward federal law enforcement, it 
would by no means eliminate the role of state and local agencies. While further 
centralization of narcotics enforcement may have benefits, in the remainder of this 
section I argue that it is also a cause for caution, if not concern. I first analyze the 
federalism concerns raised by the shifting power of the federal government in 
narcotics investigations, then discuss other potential policy implications raised by 
these changes and conclude by describing the specific implications of this analysis 
for efforts to reform the Controlled Substances Act.  
 
A. Federalism Implications of the Shifting Power of Federal Government in 
Narcotics Investigations 
 
There have long been significant concerns about the federalism implications of 
expanding federal involvement in criminal law. A 1998 report by an American Bar 
Association task force cites a number of potential adverse consequences of 
federalizing criminal law, including creating the potential for the same conduct to 
be selectively prosecuted in either the federal or state judicial system, thus 
potentially exposing similarly situated defendants to differential consequences.80 
Shifting criminal enforcement powers to the federal government also undermines 
state policymaking authority and hobbles important checks against prosecutorial 
 
79   See Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of the 
Fourth Amendment, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 549 (2013) for an argument for efficiency as an 
important consideration in surveillance policy, 
80   Baker et al., supra note 9, at 28–29.  
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overreaching.81 Unlike local prosecutors—who are generally elected officials and 
therefore subject to democratic oversight—federal prosecutors are appointed, and 
therefore restrained primarily by “self-imposed prosecutorial discretion.”82 
Furthermore, reducing the role of local law enforcement in criminal investigations 
can minimize and undermine local involvement in enforcement of criminal law.83 
By differentially increasing capacity of federal law enforcement to conduct narcotics 
investigations relative to state and local law enforcement, improvements in 
electronic surveillance technology may exacerbate many of these concerns.  
A shift toward a greater emphasis on federal law enforcement of drug crimes 
would allow federal authorities more leverage to exert their policy preferences on 
which types and in what context potentially criminal activities should be 
investigated. This is particularly concerning as it may weaken long-standing norms 
protecting state experimentation in criminal law and criminal procedure,84 and stifle 
state experimentation with liberalizing drug policy.85 This effect would persist even 
if law enforcement agencies from different levels of government engage in 
information and expertise sharing through intergovernmental cooperation, as federal 
agencies could refuse to participate in cooperative efforts that do not reflect federal 
law enforcement priorities. For example, commentators have argued that state laws 
allowing medical use of marijuana have been effective in part because, as a practical 
matter, “the federal government does not have the capacity to enforce the CSA 
against marijuana users.”86 However, advances in electronic surveillance may 
undermine pragmatic protections against enforcement of stricter federal cannabis 
prohibitions, even as against individual users.87 Had these tools been available 
 
81   Id.  
82   Id. at 32–33.  
83   Id. at 40–41 .  
84   Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 
DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 221 (1959) (“One concept that appears clearly in the earliest decisions involving 
the due process clause and state criminal procedure is the notion that the states are to be left a wide 
area of freedom to experiment with new procedural devices and that, within very broad limitations, 
local policy in the criminal area is to be permitted expression.”).  
85   See, e.g., Timothy E. Quill & Diane E. Meier, The Big Chill—Inserting the DEA into End-
of-Life Care, 354 NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 1 (2006).  
86   Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ 
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1443 (2009).  
87   In particular, the capacity of federal law enforcement to enforce federal prohibitions against 
marijuana use may be greatly increased where states include information about medical marijuana 
authorization in their state Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP). See Conn. Dep’t of 
Consumer Prot., Connecticut Prescription Monitoring & Reporting System Registration Policy and 
Procedures Manual (2016), available at https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/DCP/drug_control/PMP/pdf 
/CPMRSRegPolicyandProceduresManual112016pdf.pdf?la=en.  
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during the early days of state experimentation with medical marijuana legalization,88 
federal officials would have had much more powerful tools at their disposal to 
investigate marijuana activities that were legal under state law, potentially chilling 
the development of state medical marijuana markets.  
Furthermore, decisions about what types of narcotics activities should be 
criminally prohibited and the circumstances under which these prohibitions should 
be enforced have profound implications for the health, safety, and economic welfare 
of a state’s residents. For example, some commentators have argued that economic 
pressures created by interventions intended to reduce the availability of opioids have 
increased the potency of the opioids available in the illicit market, thus worsening 
the public health harms associated with illicit opioid consumption.89 Empirical 
studies have relatedly found that efforts to reformulate prescription opioids to 
prevent their use for non-medical purposes may have simultaneously increased the 
rate of heroin overdose, as individuals who had previously used prescription opioids 
for non-medical purposes instead substituted heroin use.90 By increasing the ability 
of federal law enforcement to enforce federal priorities related to narcotics 
enforcement, electronic surveillance may effectively decouple decisions about the 
enforcement of narcotics prohibitions from efforts to prevent, minimize, and manage 
collateral impacts of these prohibitions. This has significant implications for the 
ability of state and local governments to protect the safety, health, and welfare of 
their residents, challenging the long-standing role of state and local actors as the 
primary source of public health and safety laws in the United States federalist 
system.91  
Additionally, shifting enforcement of narcotics crimes onto centralized 
agencies with narcotics expertise, particularly federal agencies, has the potential to 
undermine the contributions of smaller, more generalist departments to the narcotics 
investigations process. Small police departments have expertise in the context of 
their communities,92 and this knowledge can be a valuable resource during 
 
88   While PDMPs long predate state medical marijuana laws, the collection information about 
individuals authorized to use medical cannabis and report that information to state PDMPs was not a 
feature of early medical marijuana laws. See Rosalie L. Pacula, Anne E. Boustead & Priscillia Hunt, 
Words Can Be Deceiving: A Review of Variation Among Legally Effective Medical Marijuana Laws in 
the United States, 7 J. DRUG POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (2014).  
89   Leo Beletsky & Corey S. Davis, Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law, Revisited, 
46 INT’L J. DRUG POL’Y 156, 158 (2017).  
90   Abby Alpert, David Powell & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Supply-Side Drug Policy in the 
Presence of Substitutes: Evidence from the Introduction of Abuse-Deterrent Opioids, 10 AM. ECON. J.: 
ECON. POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2018).  
91   James G. Hodge, Implementing Modern Public Health Goals Through Government: An 
Examination of New Federalism and Public Health Law, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 93, 94 
(1997).  
92   See David N. Falcone, L. Edward Wells & Ralph A. Weisheit, The Small-Town Police 
Department, 25 POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 371, 376-77 (2002).  
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investigations.93 While it may be possible to maintain this expertise as part of the 
narcotics investigation process through intergovernmental task forces that could 
help ensure that local expertise remains a part of narcotics investigations, it may be 
more difficult for small generalist agencies to use their expertise to help guide 
enforcement priorities without independent surveillance capabilities: “[t]he 
cooperation that exists between local and federal law enforcement…is at best 
tenuous.”94 If state and local law enforcement must rely on task forces and other 
forms of intergovernmental cooperation to engage in extensive or expensive 
electronic surveillance use, they may be less able to determine when these forms of 
surveillance should be used, despite their expertise on the context of criminal activity 
in their jurisdiction. Furthermore, the assumption that state and local police 
departments can simply rely on cooperation with federal agencies to conduct 
surveillance is troubling, given the mixed evidence on the impact of such task forces 
on crime-related outcomes.95  
 
B. Other Policy Implications of the Impact of Electronic Surveillance on Narcotics 
Investigations 
 
If changes in electronic surveillance technology has increased the efficiency 
with which law enforcement can obtain information during criminal investigations, 
the question then becomes how can—and should—these developments in turn shift 
the priorities and activities undertaken by law enforcement. If federal law 
enforcement is able to subsume more narcotics manufacturing and sales arrests due 
to improvements in capacity brought about by electronic surveillance, what role will 
state and local law enforcement continue to play in investigating narcotics crimes? 
One possibility is that state and local law enforcement shift more of their attention 
away from investigating manufacturing and sales offenses and toward investigating 
possession offenses, as a way to leverage their superior knowledge about the context 
in which crimes are committed in their community. Another possibility is that, if 
electronic surveillance allows law enforcement to collect information more 
efficiently in at least some narcotics investigations, law enforcement decision 
makers may choose to reallocate resources away from narcotics investigations and 
toward investigations of different categories of crimes with different implications 
for public health and safety.96  
 
93   Lindsey Garber, Have We Learned a Lesson? The Boston Marathon Bombings and 
Information Sharing, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 221, 245 (2015).  
94   John S. Baker, Jr., State Police Powers and the Federalization of Local Crime, 72 TEMP. L. 
REV. 673, 681 (1999).  
95   See, e.g., Brad W. Smith et al., Multijurisdictional Drug Task Forces: An Analysis of Impacts, 
28 J. CRIM. JUST. 543 (2000).  
96   For example, the extent that improvements in efficiency lessen demand on investigative 
resources at the local or state level, this may create an opportunity to address the rape kit backlog that 
currently exists in many jurisdictions in the United States. See Gelle Ellen Fucci, No Law and No 
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However, not all policy considerations point toward reallocating police 
investigation efforts to take advantage of the increases in efficiency created by 
technological change. Electronic surveillance is not costless. While electronic 
surveillance can provide benefits by allowing for more efficient and effective 
criminal investigations, it can also pose significant harms to privacy, civil liberties, 
and separation of powers. Surveillance technologies can potentially cause numerous 
privacy harms on both the individual and societal level, stifling personal expression, 
chilling free speech, and interfering with intimate relationships.97 The role of the 
judiciary in regulating executive branch agency conduct can be undermined if law 
enforcement officers can substitute established forms of surveillance that require 
judicial permission with emerging forms of electronic surveillance that have not yet 
been legally regulated, particularly where the emerging forms of electronic 
surveillance are difficult to observe.98  
Additionally, failing to account for the impact of electronic surveillance 
development on narcotics investigations, and how this impact may vary across the 
different types of agencies, can undermine efforts to evaluate the impact of narcotics 
laws on important public safety outcomes. Without an accurate understanding of the 
effects of these laws, it becomes difficult to promote policy options that best improve 
public welfare. This is particularly problematic if, as will be discussed in the next 
section, policymakers are interested in understanding the efficiency of electronic 
surveillance not just in terms of the increased ability of law enforcement to collect 
information at low cost, but in terms of the societal impacts of use of electronic 
surveillance in narcotics investigations.  
 
C. Implications for Efforts to Reform the Controlled Substances Act 
 
Given the potential harms caused by failing to account for how changes in 
technology have shifted enforcement of narcotics crimes toward federal agencies, 
the question then becomes whether and how these harms should be addressed in 
future efforts to amend the Controlled Substances Act. Considering the impact of 
electronic surveillance developments on how law enforcement agencies conduct 
narcotics investigations should be a crucial part of any efforts to reform the CSA. 
To the extent that the CSA is meant to represent a balance between treatment-
oriented and enforcement-oriented responses to the harms caused by drug use, then 
considering how technology has enhanced the efficiency of narcotics investigations 
is a necessary and important part of this discussion.  
 
Order: Local, State and Federal Government Responses to the United States Rape Kit Backlog Crisis, 
14 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 193 (2015).  
97   A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as Privacy Pollution: Learning from 
Environmental Impact Statements, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713, 1718 (2015).  
98   See Aziz Z. Huq, How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) 
Together, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 139 (2016).  
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As part of this discussion, policymakers may want to explicitly consider not 
only the impact of electronic surveillance developments on efficiency in terms of 
increased information collected at lower cost, but also the impact of electronic 
surveillance use in narcotics investigations on important societal goals related to 
narcotics investigations, such as narcotics-related violent crimes or overdose. While 
conducting these evaluations is currently difficult due to the paucity of information 
on how, when, and how often the DEA uses electronic surveillance, federal 
policymakers may find it worthwhile to make such information available such that 
the public debate around federal narcotics investigations can include a full 
accounting of the costs and benefits of these investigations.  
Finally, policymakers rethinking the role of federal law enforcement in 
investigating narcotics crimes should consider potential issues raised by the scope 
of electronic surveillance used by the CSA, and what additional forms of oversight 
could be brought to bear on this process. Given that federal law enforcement is not 
directly democratically accountable in the same way as elected sheriffs or district 
attorneys, policymakers may want to consider creating additional mechanisms for 
public oversight. For example, one option would be the establishment of a civilian 
advisory board to consider and advise on surveillance practices, as is already being 
done in some localities in the United States.99 Lawmakers could also mandate that 
the DEA publish a yearly transparency report on use of surveillance authorities and 
tools by the DEA, similar to the reports that are currently published by other 
government agencies, including the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence.100  
 
99   This board could function similarly to the Privacy Advisory Commissions utilized in several 
major cities to provide oversight on law enforcement use of surveillance. See Cyrus Farivar, Oakland 
Passes “Strongest” Surveillance Oversight Law in US, ARS TECHNICA (May 3, 2018, 4:00 AM), 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2018/05/oakland-passes-strongest-surveillance-oversight-law-in-
us/.  
100  See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, Statistical Transparency 
Report Calendar Year 2018 (2019), available at https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/ 
2019_ASTR_for_CY2018.pdf.  
